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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and recommend vessels that are suitable for inspection 
according the NII methodology, DNV-RP-G103. The theoretical guideline used during the 
analysis, DNV-RP-G103, was chosen since it is the acknowledged and recommended 
standard in the inspection industry, and it is also according to internal technical requirements 
in Statoil ASA. The thesis also includes a cost benefit assessment and discussion whether or 
not the methodology reduces the risks at for tail production field that has been in service for 
over 30-years. The scope of the thesis includes all of the production vessels in one of the 
production trains, including the test separator. A total number of six vessels, that historical 
has been opened for IVI during shutdowns where this is still the chosen inspection strategy, 
have been selected.  
 
This thesis is mainly divided into four parts; (1) A theoretical introduction of the NII 
methodology, (2) NII detailed analysis of selected pressure vessels, (3) cost benefit analysis, 
and (4) a discussion part followed by a final conclusion. The thesis focus on the detailed NII 
analysis part, since all of the data collection and decisions are performed in this section, which 
includes; (a) corrosion risk assessments, (b) offshore survey of the vessels, (c) collection of 
process and inspection data, (d) detailed NII analysis of selected vessels, and (e) selection of 
inspection zones and methods.   
 
NII is not recommended for any of the vessels considered in this thesis. It is possible to 
perform NII of four out of six vessels after the detailed analysis, which also is supported by a 
cost benefit analysis that estimates IVI to be more or less about twice the cost compared to 
NII. However, when looking at the maintenance management loop there is a challenge in the 
future related to corrosion of sealing surfaces. It is possible to inspect them, but old flaws are 
repaired by coating and would appear as a new flaw during external inspection with NDT 
methods. There are not any detailed reports describing the exact location and morphology of 
previous defects, and this leads to a need for close visual inspection of the sealing surface, to 
ensure that there are not any ongoing degradation. Implementation of NII would increase the 
costs for inspection of these vessels, and the risks and benefits of performing NII are no 
longer valid. The analysis is performed for the most corrosive part of the installation, and the 
results may have been different if the analysis was performed in other parts of the process. 
However, this analysis is considered useful as a basis for analysis of other vessels onboard the 
installation.   
 
During the analysis the recommended practice (RP) is considered to be a very useful 
guideline. It uses flow diagrams combined with detailed text and case examples that are very 
useful and understandable throughout the analysis. However, during the work with this thesis 
it has been identified sections and text that should be improved; These are (1) missing text 
and explanation to some of the flow chart boxes, (2) the RP states that it doesn’t consider the 
impact of external degradation, but it has been found to be actively used in the RP in 
evaluation during high level decision process and in one case example, and (3) in the 
coverage selection it uses the confidence of the whole corrosion risk assessment (CRA) 
during selection. This is misleading, and the assessment should be performed zone by zone. 
The author would report back the publisher, and purposed improvements of the DNV RP.     
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The NII methodology was already discussed as early as in the late 90`s. A group of companies 
in the HOIS JIP environment saw an opportunity in performing inspection of pressure vessels 
externally with the usage of NDT methods instead of the traditional IVI (Fauske and Burch, 
n.d.). The main benefits of this methodology is reduced loss of production, mechanical 
damages during preparation for internal inspection and HSE risks due to entering of the 
vessels during preparation activities and inspection.  
 
In retrospect it turns out that NII is varied used within Statoil ASA since it was first discussed 
about 15 years ago. It is therefore desirable to use the methodology on an installation that has 
been in production for over 30 years, and discuss which vessels that should be inspected 
externally with NDT according to the NII methodology.    
 
1.2 Aims of the thesis  
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and recommend vessels that are suitable for inspection 
according the NII methodology, and fully replace traditional IVI. This will also include a cost 
benefits assessment and discussion around whether or not the NII methodology reduces the 
risks. 
  
1.3 NII methodology selection and Scope  
 
It is chosen to only use the DNV recommended practice as literature for this thesis, DNV-RP-
G103”, published in 2011. There are of course many available guidance documents that are 
aimed to assist in the planning and justification of NII. However, the recommended practice 
from DNV was actually developed to bring all these documents together in one single cover, 
and it is also the recommended guideline within the HOIS JIP environment.   
 
The scope of the thesis is manly divided into four parts; (1) A theoretical introduction of the 
NII methodology, (2) To carry out the NII detailed analysis of pressure vessels, (3) To carry 
out a cost benefit analysis, and (4) a discussion part followed by a final conclusion.  
    
The theoretical part will just briefly consist of the main elements and points of the 
recommended practice to ensure that the reader gets familiar with the DNV-RP-G103. The 
thesis is mainly dominated by the detailed NII analysis part, since all of the data collection 
and decisions is carried out in this section. This part will include the following; 
 
- The CRA assessments  
- Offshore survey of the vessels  
- Screening of vessels 
- Collection inspection history in SAP 
- Recommendation of vessels that could be inspected according to the NII methodology  
10 
 
- Inspection plan that includes selection of inspection methods and areas to be inspected  
 
When the detailed NII analysis and the cost benefit assessment are finished, a final 
conclusion/discussion part is performed to consider which of the identified vessels 
recommended for NII that actually should be inspected externally with NDT. The assessment 
includes discussion of whether or not NII is reducing the risk, and if the benefits are larger 
than the costs of performing inspection according to the NII methodology.     
 
The thesis is limited to the theoretical part of the NII methodology. This means that the actual 
execution of NDT externally and the evaluation of the inspection results according to the NII 
procedure aren’t included. These activities must be performed at a later stage if the client 
chooses to implement the NII inspection strategy of recommended vessels.  
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2 Non-Intrusive Inspection Methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This part consists of a short summary of the whole DNV-RG-G103 (DNV, 2011) 
recommended practice. It includes general information about how to perform Non-Intrusive 
Inspection analysis to ensure that the reader gets short introduction and understanding of the 
recommended practice. The whole chapter 2 in the thesis is obtained from the DNV RP, and it 
is therefore not chosen to cite each text the sections below.     
2.1.1 Background and objectives 
 
There are many available guidance documents aimed to assist in the planning and justification 
of NII. The recommended practice from DNV is developed to bring all these documents 
together in one single cover, and it is now also the recommended guideline within the HOIS 
JIP environment.  
 
The main benefits of this methodology is reduced loss of production, mechanical damages 
during preparation for internal inspection and HSE risks due to entering of the vessels during 
preparation activities and inspection. 
 
2.1.2 Scope and overview of the Recommended Practice 
 
The recommended practice is aimed at the inspection of welded vessels from metals. It 
includes attached equipment to the vessels like fittings and connections associated with them 
and it provides a guideline for the following; 
 
- Determining when NII is applicable in principle   
- The information required to perform NII analysis 
- Defining requirements for the NII method(s) selected 
- Selecting methods that meets these requirements 
- Evaluating the results of inspections performed 
- Requirements related to documentation  
 
The guideline is limited by the following constraints; 
 
- It does not say when the next inspection should be performed. This is taken care of by 
the different company’s inspection philosophy and internal requirements   
- Relative cost of different inspection options isn`t included 
- It is manly just developed for pressure vessels 
- Legislative requirements aren`t included 
- It does not consider the impact of external corrosion mechanisms    
 
 
The implementation of NII would require a step change in the way of how inspection is 
performed and planned, and this is why the recommended practice provides a staged and 
12 
 
systematic process to ensure that all the needed considerations are included. The overview is 
shown in Figure 2-1.  
 
To briefly introduce the reader it starts mainly with a collection of all the data and information 
needed, and explaining the different levels and requirements of CRA (Part 1. Integrity 
Review), all of the data and information is then used in the second stage (Part 2. Decision 
Process) to screen out which of the vessels that are recommended for NII. This process is 
divided in to two parts, first a preliminary screening to screen out obvious vessels that aren`t 
recommended for NII. Then at last a detailed/high level screening is performed to ensure 
higher or at least the same accuracy and quality of obtained inspection results compared with 
traditional the IVI. The three last stages consist mainly of planning where and how to inspect 
(Part 3. Planning Process), carry out the inspections (Part 5. Inspection) and at last an 
evaluation of the results obtained (Part 6. Evaluation). The two last stages aren’t a part of this 
thesis, as earlier explained above in the introduction part. Though it is a very important part of 
the recommended practice, to ensure that the inspection activities performed in the field meets 
the minimum NII requirements.   
13 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Overview of the whole NII procedure, including all of the steps from the Integrity 
Review containing the CRA, to the last stage where the evaluation of executed NDT is 
performed (DNV, 2011).    
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2.2 Integrity Review 
 
The integrity review is mainly an overview of which data and information requirements that 
are needed to perform the NII analysis. This would include information like; type off vessel, 
material and design data, drawings, general experiences, historical repairs and/or 
modifications, accessibility to performed the NDT externally, minimum required wall 
thickness, historical inspection results, possible degradation mechanisms and operational 
experiences. The data requirements mentioned is essential to perform a screening to ensure 
that the risk levels are at the same levels or lower compared to traditional IVI.         
 
It is important to underline the importance of the CRA. It is essential in the NII methodology 
to have a detailed knowledge about the degradation mechanisms, their location and 
morphology to ensure appropriate selection of inspection methods and coverage. All 
inspection methods have different capabilities and limitations for detecting and sizing flaws. 
“You need to know what you are looking for, before you start looking”. If not, then the risk 
would increase and there may also be ongoing degradation in parts that has not been taken 
into account.  
 
There are four different CRA levels mentioned in the recommended practice. The lowest 
level, just using historical inspection results and experiences, to the highest level (CRA Type 
4) a detailed risk assessment also including theoretical calculations. The CRA is important 
and will influence the high level screening, which is performed later in the decision process. 
A poor CRA may result in not recommending a vessel to be performed with NII since the 
confident in the ability to predict both location and type of degradation is low.      
 
2.3 Decision Process 
 
In this part it is decided if vessels are suitable for non-intrusive inspection or not. The process 
is divided in to two parts, first a preliminary screening to screen out obvious vessels that 
aren`t recommended for NII and then a high level screening that ensures sufficient 
information is available and that the required inspection efficiency is being met.  
 
2.3.1 Preliminary screening  
 
The main purpose in this section is to rapidly identify which vessels that is not recommended, 
this could for example be due to that the vessel is not designed to perform NDT externally or 
it is not possible to attain the required information. The questions to be answered are shown in 
the flow diagram in Figure 2-2.  
15 
 
 
Figure 2-2: The NII preliminary screening procedure, where each questions answered leads 
to the final recommended decision (DNV, 2011).  
 
It is chosen to explain the definition of the first question “Is the vessel intrinsically suitable 
for NII?” It means that if there are any obstacles for the NII being performed. This may for 
example be; no access to surface, constraints in geometry, extremely high temperatures, or 
other relevant obstacles prohibiting the externally NDT. The rest of the questions answer 
themselves.   
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2.3.2 High-level decision process   
 
The high-level decision process is used to determine whether or not NII is appropriate in 
principle, and the decision is mostly based on the decision tree shown in Figure 2-3. The 
considerations taken in the decision tree are; 
 
1)  Confidence in the ability to predict type and location of flaws 
 
The ability to predict would depend on a large number of different factors, but the two 
main sources is evidential (From same or similar vessels) or theoretical (depending on 
the nature of the management system employed). The credibility of the evidence is 
directly linked to the amount information/data available from previously performed 
inspections. The confidence has therefore been divided into three categories, high, 
medium and low. Details of how to select the right category are given in the 
recommended practice. But as an example a “High” confidence level requires a 
thorough assessment. As a theoretical source it would require insurance that all 
relevant degradation mechanisms and their locations are predicted, which is graded as 
a CRA Type 4.   
 
2) Effectiveness of previous inspections performed 
 
This is included to ensure that probability of failure is managed. Its intent is to 
compare effectiveness of the last inspection performed relative to the traditional IVI. 
The categories are divided into high, medium and low levels. High meaning better 
probability of detecting flaws than IVI, medium the same as IVI and low meaning 
lower than IVI. Details of how to select the right category are given in the 
recommended practice. 
 
3) The rate and severity of any predicted or known degradations 
 
The worst affected zone of the vessel is used to consider if the severity and rate is 
threatening the integrity of the vessel within the remaining lifetime. The categories are 
divided into high, medium and low levels. High meaning that there can be a 
reasonable damage that threatens the integrity within the lifetime, medium that there 
are observable rates and degradation, but it is not expected to threaten the integrity 
during the vessels lifetime. And low meaning that there are degradation expected or 
just superficial degradation.   
 
The decision whether NII is suitable or not is given directly from the flow chart in Figure 2-3. 
It is important to understand that the flow chart is covering cases where the intention is to 
fully replace traditional IVI with NII. However, the recommended practice can also be used 
for cases where NII is applied as a deferment of IVI, even if NII is not recommended 
according to the screening procedure in Figure 2-3. Details of how this is performed are 
covered in the recommended practice “Section 8”. 
17 
 
  
Figure 2-3: The NII High-level screening procedure, where each questions answered leads to 
the final recommended decision (DNV, 2011).  
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2.4 Planning process 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective is to develop an inspection plan to ensure a satisfactory level of 
confidence until the next planned inspection. There are of course a lot of other considerations, 
and there may also be certain legislative requirements. The non-intrusive plan would include 
which parts that should be inspected, which methods should be used and the selection of 
coverage needed.  The steps in planning and implementation of NII are the same, regardless 
whether the requirements are determined by a RBI or a more perspective choice. This means 
that if there is already a RBI of the piping in and out of the vessel, then a lot of the data is 
already available from this analysis which could be used in the NII analysis. The 
recommended practice provides a guideline of the elements that should be analyzed, which is 
shown in a flow chart (Figure 2-4).   
 
The inspection planning team should consist of personnel with the competence within the 
following areas;  
 
1) General knowledge about construction of vessels, fabrication, materials and 
material processing 
2) Material and corrosion technology 
3) Knowledge about the systems which is being under consideration, operational 
history and general knowledge  
4) Knowledge about non-destructive testing  
 
It is not required that the inspection planning team consist of individual specialists in all the 
different fields mention above. The team who is planning the inspections could be a small one 
to ensure that it is effective, but it is then very important that the skills or competence within 
the team is high enough to avoid overlooking something.  
19 
 
Figure 2-4: Inspection planning flow chart (DNV, 2011).  
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2.4.2 Inspection strategy type 
 
The main objective is to ensure that any degradation with potential to threaten the integrity is 
detected before the next inspection. This means that the following three closely linked aspects 
must be taken into consideration, (1) degradation method, (2) potential to threaten integrity 
and (3) degree of assurance.  
 
It is also important to give a degree of assurance that unexpected degradation mechanisms are 
not occurring during the development of the inspection program. This underlines the 
importance of knowing what, where and how possible degradation mechanisms occur, which 
is part of the CRA. This would also include information or evaluation related to a prognosis 
of future operational conditions, and not just evaluation of historical evidences.  
 
There are defined three inspection types in the recommended practice which is a useful 
framework during the establishment of the inspection plan, and later during evaluations like 
the treatment of non-conformances. The definitions of each of the types are described in Table 
2-1. 
 
 
Table 2-1: Definition of Inspection Types. Detailed information of each type is found in the 
recommended practice (DNV, 2011).  
 
The selection of proper inspection types involves considerations of the degradation likelihood, 
degradation extent and degradation rate. The type is found by following the guidance 
presented in Figure 2-5. It is important to understand that the type categorization may vary 
from one zone to another, and it is therefore unique to a particular degradation mechanism.      
21 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Selection of Inspection type (DNV, 2011).   
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2.4.3 Definition of vessel zones 
 
Inspection methods have different capabilities and limitations, and it is also general 
impractical to perform NII of the entire vessel. The concept is to choose the most suitable 
inspection method for each zone, which represents different combinations of likelihood of 
degradation, remaining life tolerance and the practicality for inspection. There are many 
different factors that must be considered, like historical results, material, type and size of the 
degradation, and so on. All of the factors mentioned above provides a basis for which zone 
that should be inspected and is used to select a suitable method.  
 
To simplify the selection, it is recommended to evaluate factors such as “design”, “inspection 
history” and “operational” separately. It is also important to mention that zones which are 
separate could be considered as one. This would apply if and only if the mechanism and 
inspection method capabilities allow them to be treated as one. Figure 2-6 below shows an 
example of how different zones may be defined for a vessel.        
 
Figure 2-6: An example of how different zones may be defined (DNV, 2011).    
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2.4.4 Definition of degradation type 
 
The main objective is to identify the expected degradation at each location/zone. It is 
important that the flaws are defined by its associated morphology, since this is the factor that 
would mostly effect the selection of the suitable inspection method. It is recommended to 
categorize the different flaw types at each location, like general loss of wall thickness, 
localized loss of wall thickness, cracks, and so on. As an example, it may be helpful to 
develop a matrix as shown in Table 2-2.   
 
    
Table 2-2: Example of a matrix used to define flaw and feature combinations (DNV, 2011).  
 
2.4.5 Required inspection effectiveness  
 
The minimum required inspection effectiveness is defined for each of the vessel zones. The 
requirement will mainly depend on the likelihood of degradation, previous inspection results, 
tolerance to degradation and the consequence of vessel failure. The selection is performed by 
using the flow chart in Figure 2-7.  
 
Inspection grade; is selected depending on the number of previously inspections, rate and 
predictability of the degradations. Detailed examples of the different grades and how the 
selection is performed are found in the recommended practice.  
 
Current tolerance to degradation; is graded from low to high. High is defined as “no 
degradation expected or just superficial degradation occurring on the surface”, medium 
“known or predicted degradation are observable during the lifetime, but not threatening the 
technical integrity of the vessel”, and low “Degradation with a rate that would or may threaten 
the integrity during the lifetime”.  
 
Consequence of failure; is considered to ensure safe and reliable operation of the installation, 
which would influence the level of inspection required. It is recommended to divide the 
consequence by two areas “HSE” and “Cost of Business interruptions and consequence”. The 
consequence would in many cases be defined by the company, but there are also a lot of 
standards that is helpful in the decision of how you should perform the consequence 
classification. 
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Figure 2-7: Inspection minimum effectiveness flow chart (DNV, 2011).     
 
The flow chart provides the minimum required effectiveness for each zone, and the 
effectiveness is based on a qualitative measure of the probability of detecting flaws, including 
the coverage. The effectiveness is a function of the POD and coverage 
(Effectiveness=f(POD,xCoverage). There are given three categories, where high implies 
higher effectiveness than for IVI, medium similar to IVI, and low lower than IVI.   
2.4.6 Coverage 
 
The main intent is to establish a framework to ensure that the coverage is consistent with the 
ability to predict potential flaw areas and select the most suitable inspection method. It is 
important to underline that the defined coverage selectiveness requirements are not intended 
to determine the exact coverage for each zone of the vessel. This is covered in the chapter 
2.4.3 “Definition of vessel zones”. 
 
Three different categories are defined; the selection is determined according to the response 
given in the question in ability to detect flaws in Figure 2-3. 
 
1. Targeted; selected if there is a high confidence in the ability to predict both type and 
location of degradation. The inspection could be restricted to where the degradation is 
expected.  
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2. Targeted plus exploratory; selected if there is a medium confidence in the ability to 
predict both type and location of degradation. Both uncertain and known areas of 
degradation must be inspected.     
 
3. Global; selected if there is a low confidence in the ability to predict both type and 
location of degradation. The entire area under consideration must be inspected.  
2.4.7 Selection of inspection method 
 
Routine or specialized methods are selected depending on factor like access, geometry, 
morphology, surface, material and so on.  The main purpose is selecting the correct inspection 
method(s) to safeguard the integrity of the equipment between inspections. The degradation 
likelihood would vary zone by zone and it is therefore important to consider how applicable 
each inspection method is in each of the zones. This is essential to ensure that the integrity of 
each zone is at an acceptable level between inspections. 
 
The methods have different strength and weaknesses, and a flow chart has been developed to 
be able to select the proper method for the most common used methods in the context of NII. 
These charts are available in “Appendix F – NDT decision flow charts”. It is important to 
underline that the method capability (POD/sizing) in the charts are classified in comparison 
with IVI, and they are defined according to the following three levels in Table 2-3;  
 
Level POD Sizing 
High Method with higher POD than 
IVI 
Method able to give accurate, 
quantitative information about wall 
thickness or flaw size.   
Medium Method with similar POD 
compared with IVI 
Method able to give semi-
quantitative or comparative 
information about wall thickness or 
flaw size.   
Low Method with lower POD than 
IVI 
Method able to provide limited, 
general quantitative information 
about wall thickness or flaw size.   
Table 2-3: POD and Sizing definitions (DNV, 2011).  
 
The correct method is selected based on meeting the minimum required effectiveness given in 
Figure 2-7. This is performed by following each of the stages in the NDT decision flow charts 
in the following order; 
 
Vessel feature  Flaw Type  Surface  Temperature  Thickness  Access 
 
Typical vessel features considered in the guidance are limited to those shown in Figure 2-8 
below.  
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Figure 2-8: Vessel design, showing features considered (DNV, 2011).   
 
It is important to mention that previously inspection effectiveness has a direct influence on the 
inspection plan and the decision whether the vessel is recommended for NII or not. This 
should also be taken into account when planning, due to alternative implications of 
effectiveness that may influence future inspections.  
 
There are statistical methods available for the inspection planning process, but this is not part 
of the thesis, and is therefore not covered is this section.   
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3 Performing NII analysis 
 
Legislative requirements are not included in the recommended practice, and to make sure that 
this is taken care of the requirements from the Norwegian petroleum authority are included. 
These are covered in the management regulations, mainly the paragraph §47 “Maintenance 
programs”, which requires identification of failure modes that could pose HSE-risks. These 
modes require programs with activities to monitor degradation to ensure safe and reliable 
production (PSA, 2014). The company must according to the authority define its one strategy 
and requirements to ensure that the risks is on an acceptable level according to §47. This is 
covered in Statoil`s technical requirement, TR1987 “Program activity for static process 
equipment and load-bearing structures”.  
 
The technical requirement for pressure vessels states; “For vessels where possible internal 
failure mechanisms that are suitable for periodic inspection has been identified, it shall be 
evaluated whether this can be handled by use of Non-intrusive Inspection according to DNV 
RP-G103” (TR1987, 2014). 
 
Based on the information above, the results in this thesis meet the requirements given by the 
Norwegian petroleum authority and the internal Statoil ASA technical requirements.  
3.1 Scope of work 
 
The scope of the thesis includes all of the production vessels in one of the production trains, 
including the test separator. A total number of six vessels, that historical has been opened for 
IVI during shutdowns where this is still the chosen inspection strategy, have been selected. 
(Specialist 4, 2015).    
   
The offshore installation considered in the thesis has been in service for over 30-years, and 
the field has an increased water and decreased oil and gas production profile the last 10-20 
years. It is more or less a tail production field, and the remaining life is assumed to be about 5 
years. The topside oil processing system consists of two separate parallel production trains, 
and all of the wells could be routed to the most desirable train seen from a production 
viewpoint. The process flow is shown in Figure 3-1, and the production profile is available in 
Appendix C (Specialist 4, 2015).     
 
The main function of the oil processing system is separating gas and water from the oil in 
several pressure stages by mainly decreasing the pressure in each of the flash drums. The test 
separator has the function by its name, and is mainly a vessel to measure and collect process 
information from each well. This may for example be information about sand production, oil, 
gas and water rates, and other relevant process information if required/needed.        
 
 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3-1: Process flow for the installation. The red rings marks out all of the vessels in the NII scope. The color coding is given as blue (water), yellow 
(gas), brown (Three phase, oil, water and gas) and green (Condensate) (SO0167, 2010). 
 
3.2 Obtaining and collection of data 
 
A large amount of the data from different systems within Statoil needs to be collected and 
summarized when performing the NII analysis. This is important to highlight as the 
information is essential. It is one of the foundations used in the screening procedures and to 
ensure a high quality analysis, which requires a lot of work and effort from the author. The 
raw data is not presented or attached as an appendix since it is internal and contains some 
confidential information.      
  
The systems used during data collection in Statoil: 
 
1. PI Processbook: A system that is used to collect process data, which may be used for 
trending, analyzing or visualization of parameters like flow, pressure, temperature and 
so on. Collecting and obtaining relevant process data used for example in the 
corrosion risk assessment. 
 
2. SAP: A Maintenance and Management system in Statoil. Collecting and obtaining 
data related to maintenance programs, inspection history, costs and reported failure 
modes.   
 
3. STIDtips: Technical Information Portal in Statoil. Used to collect and obtain 
mechanical design data, general arrangement drawings, process flow diagrams, and so 
on.  
 
Data collected and obtained is summarized in a one-pager for each vessel, which is then used 
as the basis for the NII analysis. These are attached in Appendix A, and contain information 
about design data, process description, CRA and Inspection History. This is also referred as 
the “Integrity Review” according to the DNV recommended practice.  
    
3.3 NII analysis of selected pressure vessels 
 
The NII analysis methodology is similar for all vessel, and it is therefore chosen to present a 
detailed analysis of three selected pressure vessel in this chapter. The selection of presented 
vessels is not random, they are specifically chosen based on their different complexity and 
results. The results from the rest of the remaining vessels are shortly summarized chapter 3.4, 
and all the details are available in Appendix A to E. This is done to limit the number of pages 
in the main chapter, showing diversity in the decision making and at last a simplification in 
the review of the thesis.    
3.3.1 Detailed NII analysis of the test separator CD2018 
 
The author and specialists in inspection and corrosion technology in Statoil does not see the 
value in using a lot of hours in performing a detailed analysis. The vessel was part of the early 
scope, but the main reason for the early screening is based on; 
 
1) Corrosion point of view: The test separator is used to test wells, which involves 
continuously change in vessel pressure, process medium, sand, temperature, CO2, 
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H2S and so on. It is therefore only possible to develop a corrosion risk assessment that 
is valid for each well test (Specialist 1, 2015).            
   
2) Inspection point of view: The supporting structure limits access to a large amount of 
the bottom part of the vessel. Previous inspection history reports corrosion/erosion in 
the bottom level, which implies that this is one of the areas that would require a 
hundred percent coverage and access. Further, there is also an experience of corrosion 
in the sealing surface at the flanges. There are no known available inspection methods 
which can be used to inspect the sealing surface of the RTJ-flanges (Specialist 4, 
2015).            
 
The DNV recommended practice is a guideline of how the analysis should be performed. In 
this case the author together with specialists in the corrosion and inspection field has chosen 
to screen the vessels based on “sound engineering and commercial judgment by competent 
personnel”. The above decision is according to and also highlighted in the DNV 
recommended practice. The data used in the above decision is available in the “Integrity 
Review” and the “NII analysis” respectively available in Appendix A and D. 
3.3.2 Detailed NII analysis of CD2101 
 
The author and specialists in inspection technology in Statoil does not see the value in using a 
lot of hours in performing a detailed analysis. The vessel was part of the early scope, but the 
main reason for the early screening is based on; 
   
1) Inspection point of view: There is an experience of corrosion in the sealing surface at 
the flanges, and there are no known available inspection methods which can be used to 
inspect the sealing surface of the RTJ-flanges (Specialist 4, 2015).            
 
The screening is based on the same principle as the test separator, “a sound engineering and 
commercial judgment by competent personnel”. The data used in the above decision is 
available in the “Integrity Review” and the “NII analysis” respectively available in Appendix 
A and D. 
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3.3.3 Detailed NII analysis of Crude flash drum No. 3-CD2104 
 
The worst location is chosen to be considered when answering the different questions and 
performing the analysis below. It provides an example that shows how the NII analysis is 
performed in detail. The rest of the areas/locations follows the same methodology, and are 
listed in tables under each chapter.   
A) Integrity review 
 
The data and information used in this section is available in one-pagers for each vessel in 
Appendix A.  
A1) Mechanical and process data 
 
Table 3-1 below summarizes the necessary mechanical and design data for the inlet pressure 
vessel.  
   
Design Code Design ASME VIII Div. 1 
Design Pressure (barg) 3,4 
Design Temperature (°C) 121 
Material Carbon Steel/SA-285-GR C 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 10,5 
Insulation  No 
Sealing surface Nozzles RF 
Table 3-1: Mechanical data for crude flash drum no. 3 - CD2104 collected from the data 
system in Statoil ASA (STIDtips, 2015) 
 
Table 3-2 below summarizes the necessary process data for the inlet pressure vessel.  
 
Operating Pressure(barg) 0,95 
Operating Temperature (°C) 66,5 
CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
H2S (ppm)  12 
Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
pH 9,1 
Table 3-2: Process data for crude flash drum no. 3 - CD2104 collected from the data system 
and chemical responsible in Statoil ASA (STIDtips, 2015; Specialist 2, 2015; PI Processbook, 
2015) 
 
A2) Process description 
 
Feed from crude flash drum No. 2 (CD2103) enters vessel in the top head section. The 
pressure is decreased to flash out lighter hydrocarbon components from the oil stream. The 
main function of the vessel is to separate gas from the oil stream. The vessel is directly 
connected with the underlying Coalescer (CD2121), which entails that there is not any water 
level inside the flash drum no. 3 (SO0167, 2010). 
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Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical 
operations, planned modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel) 
 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other field’s shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement (Specialist 4, 2015).  
 
The vessel is coated with ceramic painting (Type CK54) from 5 to 7 o`clock (17% of internal 
surface coated) due to previous experience with corrosion attacks in the bottom part of vessels 
(SAP, 2015).    
 
A3) Inspection history 
 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2000, 2006 and 2009. The data below is collected from 
the maintenance and management system, SAP in Statoil ASA. Date of the data collection 
2015-04-08.   
 
Last inspection in 2009:  
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
manhole and nozzle K3A (% degradation of the sealing surface not reported, but the areas 
needed to be repaired during the shutdown). Small areas of the coating were damaged, these 
was not repaired and are known damages which shows no further developments since last IVI 
in 2006. Baseline thickness head/shell= 13/12 mm (SAP, 2015). 
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2000 and 2006 have reported overall good condition. 
Generally flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during shutdowns, which imply that 
there is a need to continuously inspect sealing surfaces in future shutdowns (SAP, 2015).    
A4) Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA) 
 
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion (Specialist 1, 2015). 
 
CO2: Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,25 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated. The combination of 0,5mol% CO2 and a pressure 
lower than 19barg causes the CO2 fugacity to be lower than the area of validity in the model. 
The expected corrosion rate for pH 9,1and at a pressure lower than 19 barg will most likely be 
lower than 0,25 mm/year (Specialist 1, 2015; NORSOK M-506, 2005).  
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
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pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel (Specialist 1, 2015; TR2023, 2014).     
 
Erosion: The damage mechanism is neglected since there is not a water jet system in 
combination with solids/sand. Further the amount of solids are lighter, more or less clay. 
There could however be a small amount of sand/solids that follows the oil stream when the 
water jet system is used in flash drum No. 2 (CD2103). The main reason is that sand particles 
could be stirred up during operation of the water jet system. The particles/solids are than 
mixed with the oil stream, and further on carried over in the oil outlet (Specialist 1, 2015; 
Specialist 3,2015).   
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the coating is intact 
(Specialist 1, 2015).    
 
CO2 damage mechanisms would occur in the gas zone of the vessel, especially in areas where 
water condensates and accumulates. The corrosion can be relatively uniform (General 
corrosion). All of the above mentioned mechanisms could take place in the oil and water zone 
in the vessel. MIC and erosion can be highly localized (Localized corrosion). However, 
corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the coating is intact (Specialist 4, 
2015).        
  
A5) Structural integrity assessment 
 
Fitness for service analysis according to API 579 Level 2 for local metal loss is performed. A 
localized corroded area of 15x15mm, with a remaining wall thickness of 3,5mm is allowed. 
This includes an uncertainty of 0,5mm for depth measurement performed with standard 
ultrasound inspection method (Specialist 5, 2015). 
B) NII Decision process 
 
Information and data used is available in Appendix A to D. 
B1) Preliminary screening  
 
Preliminary screening preformed according to Figure 2-2 in chapter 2.3.1 above.  
 
A) Is the vessel intrinsically suitable for NII?  
Yes, the vessel surface is easily accessible and there are no obvious limitations of performing 
NII. Based on offshore survey, see pictures in Appendix B.  
 
B) Has the vessel previously been inspected?  
Yes, several times and last inspected in 2009.  
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C) Is operating history still relevant? 
Yes, there are no major changes that effects the operating history the last 6-years and for the 
future operation of the vessel. Details are available in Appendix C “Production profile and 
data”. 
 
B) Is entry scheduled for other reasons? 
No, there are no activities in the SAP maintenance management system that requires entry.  
 
Preliminary screening result: Perform a high-level decision according to Figure 2-3 in 
chapter 2.3.2.   
B2) High-level decision process  
 
High-level decision performed according to Figure 2-3 in chapter 2.3.2.   
 
A) Confidence in the ability to predict type and location of degradation? 
Medium, based on a theoretical source CRA Type 2 performed. Selection of medium is also 
supported by an evidential source, the inspection history of three previously inspections 
summarized above for the vessel under consideration.  
 
B) Previously inspection effectiveness?  
Medium, based on that previous inspection is performed with IVI.  
 
C) Severity and rate of degradation? 
High, based on the degradation experience and repair history of sealing surfaces at the raised 
faced flanges. Sealing surfaces would require opening and repairs within the next 5 years 
(Within the expected lifetime of the installation).    
 
High-level decision result: NII not possible mainly based on the answer given in the last 
question. However, if the previous inspections effectiveness had been high, then NII would be 
possible. A high previously inspection effectiveness would not change the experience related 
to degradation of flanges and NDT of sealing surfaces would actually reduce the risk of a 
potential failure prior to scheduled shutdowns. NII is possible and risk reducing based on the 
above justification.  
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C) Planning process 
C1) Identify inspection zones 
 
The inspection zones are first of all mainly divided based on the likelihood and type of 
degradation, areas with same or similar operational service. If needed, each zone is again 
divided based on previously inspection history and mechanical design and manufacturing 
factors. Data source used in the selection is available in chapter A) “Integrity Review”. 
Description and location of each zone is found in Table 3-3 and Figure 3-2. 
 
Tag No. Description Location Zone Feature 
CD2104 Crude flash drum No 3 
Above fluid level 
A Cylindrical Shell A 
B Cylindrical Shell B 
C Nozzles 
D Raised Faced surface 
Below fluid level 
E Cylindrical Shell D 
F Nozzles 
G Raised Faced surface 
Table 3-3: Inspection zones, locations and features for flash drum no. 3 - CD2104.  
 
  
 
 Figure 3-2: Inspection zones, locations and features flash drum no. 3 - CD2104. Brown area marks out the area with liquid (oil and water), and the 
yellow area the gas level (STIDtips, 2015). 
 
 
C2) Definition of degradation type 
 
Table 3-4 below shows the expected degradation mechanism and the corresponding defect 
type for each inspection zone. Data source used in the selection is available in chapter 3.3.3 
A) “Integrity Review”. 
 
Table 3-4: Degradation mechanism and defect type for each inspection zone for flash drum 
No. 3 - CD2104.  
 
C3) Determine inspection strategy type 
 
Inspection strategy type performed according to Figure 2-5 in chapter 2.4.2 .  
 
A) Degradation likelihood? 
High, based on the degradation experience and repair history of sealing surfaces.  
 
B) Degradation extent? 
Localized (Clearly identifiable), based on the degradation experience and repair history of 
sealing surfaces.  
 
C) Degradation Rate? 
High, based on the degradation experience and repair history of sealing surfaces at the raised 
faced flanges. Sealing surfaces would require opening and repairs within the next 5 years 
(Within the expected lifetime of the installation).    
 
Inspection type result: Inspection Type C, based on sealing surface corrosion experience 
which is the worst location of the vessel. However, Table 3-5 shows that degradation 
internally in the shell and nozzles is rated differently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zone Feature Degradation Mechanism Defect Type 
A Cylindrical Shell A CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
B Cylindrical Shell B CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
C Nozzles CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
D Raised Faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
E Cylindrical Shell D 
MIC 
CO2/H2S 
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
F Nozzles 
MIC 
CO2/H2S 
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
G Raised Faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
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Zone Feature 
Degradation 
Likelihood 
Degradation 
Extent 
Degradation 
Rate  
Inspection 
Type Comment 
A 
Cylindrical 
Shell A 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion 
Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability 
and corrosion 
rate 
B 
Cylindrical 
Shell B 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion 
Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability 
and corrosion 
rate 
C Nozzles Medium 
General 
Corrosion 
Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability 
and corrosion 
rate 
D 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) 
High C 
Based on 
inspection 
history 
E 
Cylindrical 
Shell D 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion 
Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability 
and corrosion 
rate 
F Nozzles Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion 
Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability 
and corrosion 
rate 
G 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) 
High C 
Based on 
inspection 
history 
 Table 3-5: Inspection strategy type for each inspection zone in flash drum No. 3 - CD2104.  
 
C4) Determine minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage 
 
Minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage performed according to Figure 2-7 in chapter 
2.4.5 and 2.4.6.  
 
A) Inspection grade? 
Grade 0, rate of degradation high based on the degradation experience and repair history of 
sealing surfaces at the raised faced flanges. 
 
B) Current tolerance to degradation? 
Low, failure at sealing surfaces at raised faced flanges expected within the remaining lifetime 
of the installation (Next 5 years).  
 
C) Consequence of failure? 
High, based on the criticality assessment of the equipment (Containing oil and gas, and a 
failure may lead to high HMS consequences) 
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D) Coverage? 
Targeted plus, but justified to Global due to experience of damages at raised faced flanges.  
 
Minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage: High minimum inspection effectiveness 
and coverage Global, based on sealing surface corrosion experience which is the worst 
location of the vessel. However, Table 3-6 below shows that effectiveness and coverage 
internally in the shell and nozzles is rated differently. The coverage from the bottom part of 
the vessel is changed from targeted puss to global, since corrosion would occur in areas where 
the coating is damaged.  
 
 
Zone Feature 
Inspec-
tion 
grade 
Current 
tolerance of 
degradation 
Consequence 
of failure 
Minimum 
inspection 
effectiveness  
Confi -
dence 
(Figure 
2-3) 
Coverage 
A 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
A 
Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium 
Targeted 
plus 
B 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
B 
Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium 
Targeted 
plus 
C Nozzles Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium 
Targeted 
plus 
D 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
E 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
D 
Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
F Nozzles Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
G 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
Table 3-6: Minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage for each inspection zone in flash 
drum No. 3 -CD2104.  
 
C5) Determine efficiency of candidate inspection methods 
 
The inspection methods are chosen based the experience/knowledge of the inspection 
responsible in Statoil and it is therefore not needed to work through all of the NDT flow 
charts in Appendix F. The flow chart for the selected inspection method is consulted to ensure 
that the method has at least the minimum inspection effectiveness required according to Table 
3-6. The required information and selection of inspection methods are given in Table 3-7.   
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Zone Feature Defect 
Type 
Surface 
Surface 
temperature 
Thickness 
Minimum 
inspection 
effectiveness  
Selected 
technique 
(POD/sizing) 
A 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
A 
General  Paint About 60°C  13/12 mm Medium 
Phased Array 
– XY 
scanner(H/H) 
B 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
B 
General  Paint About 60°C 13/12 mm Medium 
Phased Array 
– XY 
scanner(H/H) 
C Nozzles General  Paint About 60°C Various Medium 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
D 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
Localiz
ed  
Paint About 60°C Various High 
Flange 
scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
E 
Cylindri
cal Shell 
D 
Localiz
ed 
General  
Paint About 60°C 13/12 mm Medium 
Phased Array 
– XY 
scanner(H/H) 
F Nozzles 
Localiz
ed 
General  
Paint About 60°C Various Medium 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
G 
Raised 
Faced 
surface 
Localiz
ed  
Paint About 60°C Various High 
Flange 
scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
Table 3-7: Selection of NDE techniques for each inspection zone in flash drum No. 3 - 
CD2104.  
 
All of the techniques in the table above meet the minimum required effectiveness. The list 
does not cover exact dimensions and location of each zone. This must be provided in a 
specified work package before execution of the NII inspection scope. Welds are considered to 
be ground flat at cylindrical shell, if there are areas where welds aren`t ground flat TOFD is to 
be used. HT (High temperature) equipment is available if needed.  
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3.4 Summarized results from the remaining vessels 
 
The data used in the decisions is available in Appendix A to D. It is worth mentioning that all 
of the vessels from CD2102 to CD2121 have a lower pressure class, and they do not have any 
RTJ-flanges. However, all of the vessels have the same experience related to corrosion of 
sealing surfaces at the flange connections.   
3.4.1. NII result Crude flash drum No. 1 (CD2102) 
 
NII is possible. Inspection zones, coverage and selected inspection methods are defined in 
Appendix D, and detailed drawings of vessel marked with inspection zones are available in 
appendix E.  
3.4.2. NII result Crude flash drum No. 2 (CD2103) 
 
NII is possible. Inspection zones, coverage and selected inspection methods are defined in 
Appendix D, and detailed drawings of vessel marked with inspection zones are available in 
appendix E.  
3.4.3. NII result Coalescer (CD2121) 
 
NII is possible. Inspection zones, coverage and selected inspection methods are defined in 
Appendix D, and detailed drawings of vessel marked with inspection zones are available in 
appendix E.  
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4 Performing cost benefit analysis  
 
The four vessels that could be inspected externally according to the NII methodology are 
selected in the cost benefit analysis. Actual costs are used in the detailed assessment, but due 
to confidentially the rates and amounts are removed in the thesis. Instead it is chosen to use a 
fraction factor.  
 
Table 4-1 lists up the cost benefit results for each vessel and all combined.  
 
TAG Description Scaffolding  Insulation Area(m
2
) Fraction(Cost IVI/Cost NII) 
CD2102 Crude flash 
drum No. 1 
NA YES 66 2,21 
CD2103 Crude flash 
drum No. 2 
YES YES 67 1,61 
CD2104 Crude flash 
drum No. 3 
NA NA 42 0,8 
CD2121 Coalescer YES NA 115 3,6 
Total fraction (Tot. costs IVI divided tot. costs NII) 290 2,24 
Table 4-1: Cost benefit analysis of vessels possible for NII. Area given in the table indicates 
the vessel surface that needs to be inspected.    
 
The cost benefit analysis performed indicates that the cost of IVI is about twice as high that 
NII. The estimate above does not include the production loss due to opening of equipment 
when performing IVI. The fraction above would be higher if production loss is included, but 
the calculation would depend on several factors, some of them listed below; 
 
A) The amount of vessels that are not opened during a future shutdown. 
B) If some of these are in the critical line of work, governing for the finish date of the 
shutdown.   
C) Maximum allowed resources onboard the installation during the shutdown.  
D) The amount of mechanical resources available during the shutdown. 
E) Location of the process equipment.  
 
These are just some of the factors, and in combination all of these would affect the time 
needed to finish within a given timeline during a shutdown. Hours saved on one vessel could 
not be directly calculated as saved loss of production days. The amount of resources released 
works in many different disciplines, and just a small amount of hours is directly released to 
decrease the timeline of the shutdown. The maximum number of allowed resources onboard 
the installation will also affect the calculation. This is just a small example that shows that it 
is not possible to develop a standard practice to calculate the reduction of days. Each case 
must be treated separately to ensure reliable estimates.         
 
However, the estimated cost related to production loss would not affect the decision it this 
case since the costs of performing IVI is higher than the costs of NII. The estimated loss of 
production would just strengthen the decision to recommending NII.    
 
Benefits of performing NII: (1) Reduced loss of production and costs, (2) Removes the 
uncertainty of potential mechanical damages during preparation for internal inspection, and 
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(3) Reduces HSE risks due to no entering of the vessels during preparation activities and 
inspection. 
  
The recommendation is clear, NII is cost reducing combined with several HSE benefits. 
NII should be performed based on the above justification.   
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5 Discussion 
 
The discussion is divided into three parts, following the structure of the thesis. The first part 
covers a discussion of the theoretical part of the NII methodology, followed by a discussion of 
the NII analyze results, some recommendations and viewpoints, and at last challenges during 
the thesis.   
 
5.1    NII methodology 
 
Section 2 of the DNV recommended practice; 
 
Figure 2-1 shows a flow chart “overview of the process”. Two headline boxes are 
recommended to be changed. The first one, “selection of vessels”, is not explained in the 
detailed text part of the RP and the reader would be confused since he would look through the 
text without finding any explanation of how to select vessels. There should be added a 
headline, and a short recommendation of who, what and how to select vessels.  
 
The second one, “Determining the next inspection date”, is not explained in the detailed text 
part of the RP and the reader would be confused since he would start looking through the text 
without finding any explanation of determining the next inspection date. The headline box 
should be removed, the next inspection date does not have any influence on the decision 
whether NII is possible or not. 
 
Section 3 of the DNV recommended practice; 
 
In the high-level screening process the question of “Confidence in the ability to predict type 
and location of degradation”, the RP has an example under the evidential requirement for 
selecting high. Quoting the sentence “Note that extensive experience is taken to mean that 
data is available covering at least eight inspections in total and not less than two inspections 
for the longest serving single vessel used in making the judgment, at least one of which 
should have been a close visual inspection (internal or external depending on the nature of the 
degradation)” (DNV, 2011). It is not understandable why the RP is mentioning visual external 
inspection, when the whole methodology is based on internal degradation. It is also stated in 
the scope of the RP, in chapter 1.3, that it does not consider the impact of external 
degradation. The impact of external corrosion is however used in a case example in the RP, 
rating the “severity and rate of corrosion” based on external corrosion. The details of the case 
example are available in chapter 3.5.3 “Separator vessel”. This is not consistent with the 
methodology, and it is recommended to correct the content in the RP.  
 
Section 4 of the DNV recommended practice; 
 
Figure 2-4 shows the whole inspection planning process. However, the order of the boxes 
should be changed. To be able to select and determine inspection strategy type, you must first 
identify the zones, and then determine anticipated degradation type at each zone.  
 
The coverage selection is a weakness of the standard. The coverage selected and used as a 
framework should be selected zone by zone, and shall not be based on a general response 
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given in the question “Confidence in ability to predict types and locations of degradation” in 
Figure 2-3. For example, when the response is high or medium, the RP states targeted or 
targeted plus coverage. This does not consider if the vessel is internally coated in the bottom 
part, which implies that there should be a global coverage of this zone. It does not help the 
user/reader to select the recommended coverage, and it is recommended to include text stating 
that the coverage should be assessed zone by zone as part of the standard.  
5.2  NII Analysis Results 
 
NII inspection is recommended for four out of six vessels. The decision is also supported by 
the cost benefit analysis, which implies that the costs are reduced together with increased 
benefits. The two first separators (inlet and test) were mainly screened-out due to no available 
inspection methods for inspection of the sealing surface of RTJ-flanges.  
 
It is important to highlight the experience of corrosion in sealing surfaces. This is a known 
mechanism applicable to all of the vessels. The common repair practice is coating with 
Belzona, which is a ceramic filled epoxy coating. When the NDT operator scans a flange with 
an old damage, it would appear as a corroded area. This would be reported as a finding, and 
previous reports contain limited information about the accurate location and morphology of 
the old flaws/repairs. The question if this is an old or new damage is raised? Based on the 
above justification, the answer would be that it is probably an old damage, but it would be far 
from certain. A new inception must be scheduled to document if there is ongoing degradation. 
There are always uncertainties in all of the inspection methods, and the newly scheduled 
inspection may show a slight increase in degradation even if there has not been any further 
development. The above case would generate a decision to open the flange for close visual 
inspection, which requires a shutdown of the installation. To support the justification above, 
old case examples of corroded sealing surfaces are attached in Appendix G.       
 
The above case example show how a decision to perform NII can be made, which is also 
supported by a cost benefit analysis. But it is in this case a poor decision that actually 
will increase costs and unnecessary usage of resource. Scanning of the flanges will report 
findings that actually would require a shutdown to perform close visual inspection of the 
sealing surfaces.   
 
5.3 Recommendations and viewpoints 
 
NII is not recommended to fully replace traditional IVI before there are available detailed 
reports of each sealing surface, which must include exact location, depth and morphology of 
the repaired damage. This requires opening of the nozzles during the next scheduled 
shutdown and inspection of the flanges. If earlier repairs are considered fit for service, 
meaning that old repairs are not damaged and the rest of the sealing surface are not corroded, 
then the surface must be scanned with phased array. The results from the scan must be saved 
and used as a blueprint for future inspections when performing NII. 
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The recommendation above enables implementation of NII for all vessels with raised faced 
sealing surfaces, and to enhance the usage of NII there should be increased focus on future 
development of methods which can be used to inspect the sealing surfaces of RTJ flanges.  
 
A much more sustainable alternative for the future is the usage of corrosion resistant 
materials, which in this case could be achieved through welding the sealing surfaces with 
corrosion resistant material. This would remove the uncertainties related to corrosion and 
inspection of the sealing surfaces.  
 
The above alternatives are not recommended for this installation due to the short remaining 
lifetime. The installation would not benefit from these since there is just one last scheduled 
shutdown in the future. However, similar installations with a longer remaining lifetime with 
two or more scheduled shutdowns should consider the above recommendations.   
 
Implementation of NII should also be seen in correlation with challenges in the industry 
related to corrosion under insulation. There are significant benefits of combining NII and a 
corrosion under insulation program. Cost and scope is reduced since parts of the insulation 
must be removed to get access to the external surface during NII.  
 
The NII methodology reduces risks related to potential leakages since there is no need to 
disassemble pipe/nozzle connections, which could be misaligned during mechanical assembly 
of the connections.   
 
It is important to emphasize that the installation under consideration has an old design 
philosophy, and it has been in service for over 30-years. It is not surprising that 
implementation of NII is a challenge, and there may, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, be 
other less corrosive vessels where the NII methodology is more suitable. It is not part of the 
thesis, but it is important to mention that newer installations usually designs vessels with 
corrosion resistant cladding internal, and the NII analysis would be completely different for 
these. But these vessels are not completely free of challenges, and there are a lot of 
experiences today with cladding flaws from fabrication in the nozzle to shell connections.  
And as an example, both IVI and external NDT would not detect areas where the cladding is 
to thin (Specialist 4, 2015).    
  
5.4 Challenges during the thesis 
 
The main challenge during the writing process was that a lot of the work and information is 
confidential. The author therefore had to consider the data very carefully before presenting it 
in the thesis. As a result it was difficult to justify some of the decisions and present details of 
the work in the thesis, especially when certain facts and evidence had to be left out.  
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6 Conclusion  
 
The conclusion is divided into two parts, the first a specific that covers the NII analysis of the 
vessels in this thesis, and the last a general which covers mainly the theoretical parts of the 
thesis, the DNV-RP-G103.   
 
6.1 General 
 
During the analysis the RP is considered to be a very useful guideline. It uses flow diagrams 
combined with detailed text and case examples that are very useful and understandable 
throughout the analysis. However, during the work with this thesis it has been identified 
sections and text that should be improved; These are (1) missing text and explanation to some 
of the flow chart boxes, (2) the RP states that it doesn’t consider the impact of external 
degradation, but it has been found to be actively used in the RP in evaluation during high 
level decision process and in one case example, and (3) in the coverage selection it uses the 
confidence of the whole CRA during selection. This is misleading, and the assessment should 
be performed zone by zone.  The author would report back the publisher, and purposed 
improvements of the DNV RP.    
 
6.2   Specific 
 
NII is not recommended for any of the vessels considered in this thesis. It is possible to 
perform NII of four out of six vessels after the detailed analysis, which also is supported by a 
cost benefit analysis that estimates IVI to be more or less about twice the cost compared to 
NII. However, when looking at the maintenance management loop there is a challenge in the 
future related to corrosion of sealing surfaces. It is possible to inspect them, but old flaws are 
repaired by coating and would appear as a new flaw during external inspection with NDT 
methods. There are not any detailed reports describing the exact location and morphology of 
previous defects, and this leads to a need for close visual inspection of the sealing surface to 
ensure that there are not any ongoing degradation.  
 
Implementation of NII would increase the costs for inspection of these vessels, and the risks 
and benefits of performing NII are no longer valid. The analysis is performed for the most 
corrosive part of the installation, and the results may have been different if the analysis was 
performed in other parts of the process. However, this analysis is considered useful as a basis 
for analysis of other vessels onboard the installation 
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Appendix A – One pager design data, process description, CRA and 
Inspection History of vessels – Integrity Review  
 
All of the “one pagers” (Integrity Review) developed below for each vessel is built up from 
multiple sources and references. These are the same under each heading and vessel, therefore 
it is chosen to list up which references and systems that are used for each heading. This is 
done to simplify the review and avoiding repeating these for each vessel/heading.  
 
Reference and system overview; 
 
- Mechanical Data (STIDtips, 2015)  
- Process Data (STIDtips, 2015; Specialist 2, 2015) 
- Process Description (SO0167, 2010; Specialist 4, 2015; SAP, 2015).    
- Inspection History (SAP, 2015) 
- Corrosion Risk Assessment – CRA (Specialist 1, 2015; NORSOK M-506, 2005; 
Specialist 1, 2015; TR2023, 2014; Specialist 3, 2015).     
A.1 Test separator CD2018 
 
   
Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 2)                                        Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 89,7  Operating Pressure(barg) 0 to 55 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 10 to 85 
Material Carbon steel 
SA-516-GR70 
 CO2 (mol %) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (mol %) N/A 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 70/65  Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
Insulation Yes  pH 7,0 
Sealing surface Nozzles RTJ&RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF) and Ring Type Joint (RTJ) 
 
 
Process Description: 
Feed is based on which well that is tested, and time on test for each well can vary which is the 
main reason for the variety in the operational parameters listed above. The main function of 
the vessel is to collect process information from each well, for example information about 
sand production, oil, gas and water rates. The H2S is not listed above due to high variation in 
depending on which well that is tested. 
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, planned  
modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields show higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with Belzona from 2 to 10 o`clock due to previous experience with 
corrosion attacks in the vessel. Three anodes are mounted in the bottom part of the vessel 
(Type ZT780, New in 2007). 
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Inspection History Date of collection 2015-03-03 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Baseline thickness 
head/shell = 76/66mm 
 
Last inspection in 2014: 
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surfaces or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
manhole and the nozzles K1B and N9 (from 50 to 100% of primary sealing surface on RTJ 
flanges). Small areas of the Belzona coating were damaged and the damages were localized in 
the area where the coating was repaired in 2011. The anode consumption was lower than 5% 
(New installed in 2007). 
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2011 reported localized corrosion in 
the bottom part of the vessel, with depths up to 10,0 mm. These are known damages, and no 
further development of the corrosion attacks have been observed. Generally Belzona and 
flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during each shutdown, which implies that there is a 
need to continuously maintain the coating and inspect sealing surfaces in future shutdowns. 
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA) 
Damage Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,15 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated.  The expected corrosion rate for pH 7 will most likely 
be lower than 0,15 mm/year. 
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects of H2S 
on the corrosion rate. Sour service and risk of cracking due to H2S is not applicable as the 
partial pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa. However,  H2S may contribute to corrosion if an iron 
sulphide is deposited on the steel surface 
 
Erosion: Erosion can occur in the bottom part of the vessel shell where the water jet system is 
used to remove sand and solid that have settled in the bottom of the vessel. The erosion rate 
depends on the amount of sand/solids, particle size, nozzle orientation and water pressure 
when operating the water jet system. (Skriv heller noen få ord om erfaringer med erosjon pga 
jetting, og at dette er en reell risiko). 
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. 
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the Belzona coating is intact and if 
the sacrificial anodes are working properly. 
 
The test separator is used to test many different wells, and this causes continuous changes in 
vessel pressure, temperature, process medium, flow rates, sand content, temperature, CO2-
/H2S-content, and so on. Due to frequent changes of wells being tested there is a risk that the 
corrosion risk assessment will not be valid for the true operational conditions.  The corrosion 
risk assessment should not be used as a basis for future expected corrosion mechanisms and 
corrosion rates, as these will change for every well being tested. 
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A.2 Inlet separator CD2101 
 
 
   Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 2)                                     Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 89,7  Operating Pressure(barg) 38 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 52 
Material Carbon Steel 
SA-516-GR70 
 CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (ppm)  10 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 100,7  Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
Insulation  Yes  pH 7,0 
Sealing surface Nozzles RTJ&RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF) and Ring Type Joint 
(RTJ) 
 
 
Process Description:  
Feed for multiple wells enter the top middle section the vessel. The mixture from the wells 
creates an average temperature and pressure at 52°C and 38 barg respectively. The vessel has 
two oil outlets and is designed as a two in one separator. The main function of the vessel is to 
separate water and gas from the oil stream.   
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, planned 
modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel…) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with Belzona from 3 to 9 o`clock (50% of internal surface coated) due to 
previous experience with corrosion attacks in the vessel. Five anodes are mounted in the 
bottom part of the vessel (Type ZT780, new in 2007)  
 
 
Inspection History Date of collection 2015-03-15 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Baseline thickness 
head/shell = 102/110 mm 
 
Last inspection in 2014:  
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
manhole and the nozzles N10 and N5 (from 30 to 100% of primary sealing surface on RTJ 
flanges). Small areas of the Belzona coating was damaged, and the damages most probably in 
the same areas reported in 2011 which wasn`t renewed. The anode consumption was lower 
than 10% (New in 2007). 
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2011 reported localized corrosion in 
the bottom part of the vessel, with depths up to 7,0 mm(last reported in 2006). These are 
known damages, and no further development of the corrosion attacks have been observed 
since 2006. Generally Belzona and flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during each 
shutdown, which implies that there is a need to continuously maintain the coating and inspect 
sealing surfaces in future shutdowns.    
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA)  
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,36 mm/year. 
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The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated.  The expected corrosion rate for pH 7 will most likely 
be lower than 0,36 mm/year. 
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel.     
 
Erosion: May occur in the bottom part of the vessel shell where the water jet system is used in 
combination with sand particles. The rate depends highly on the amount of sand, particle size, 
nozzle orientation and water pressure when operating the water jet system. It is possible to get 
high rates, since this may introduce the same effects as you would get from sandblasting a 
metallic material.   
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the Belzona coating is 
intact or when the anodes protect the carbon steel with an electro potential lower than -900 
mV. 
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the Belzona coating is intact and if 
the sacrificial anodes are working properly.  
       
 
A.3 Crude flash drum No. 1 CD2102 
 
 
   Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 2)                                            Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 34,5  Operating Pressure(barg) 16 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 52 
Material Carbon Steel 
SA-516-GR70 
 CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (ppm)  11 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 44,5/37  Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
Insulation  Yes  pH 7,0 
Sealing surface Nozzles RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF)  
 
  . 
Process Description:  
Feed from inlet separator (CD2101) enters vessel in top head section. The pressure is 
decreased to flash out lighter hydrocarbon components from the oil stream. The main function 
of the vessel is to separate water and gas from the oil stream.   
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, planned 
modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel…) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with Belzona from 3 to 9 o`clock (50% of internal surface coated) due to 
previous experience with corrosion attacks in the vessel. Four anodes are mounted in the 
bottom part of the vessel (Type ZT780, new in 2014).  
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Inspection History Date of collection 2015-03-23 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2006, 2007, 2011 and 2014. Baseline thickness 
head/shell = 48,5/37 mm 
 
Last inspection in 2014:  
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
nozzle K1A (50% of primary sealing surface on RF flange). Small areas of the Belzona 
coating was damaged, these areas were repaired during the shutdown. The anode consumption 
was 40% (Last changed 2007). New anodes mounted during the shutdown.  
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2007 and 2011 reported localized corrosion in the bottom 
part of the vessel, with depths up to 9,0 mm(last reported in 2007). These are known damages, 
and no further development of the corrosion attacks have been observed since 2007. 
Generally Belzona and flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during shutdowns, which 
imply that there is a need to continuously maintain the coating and inspect sealing surfaces in 
future shutdowns.    
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA)   
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,25 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated. The combination of 0,5mol% CO2 and a pressure 
lower than 19barg causes the CO2 fugacity to be lower than the area of validity in the model.    
The expected corrosion rate for pH 7 and at a pressure lower than 19 barg will most likely be 
lower than 0,25 mm/year.  
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel.     
 
Erosion: May occur in the bottom part of the vessel shell where the water jet system is used in 
combination with sand particles. The rate depends highly on the amount of sand, particle size, 
nozzle orientation and water pressure when operating the water jet system. It is possible to get 
high rates, since this may introduce the same effects as you would get from sandblasting a 
metallic material. The probability of erosion is lower than the inlet separator since most of the 
solids/particles are separated in the first separator.    
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the Belzona coating is 
intact or when the anodes protect the carbon steel with an electro potential lower than -900 
mV. 
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the Belzona coating is intact and if 
the sacrificial anodes are working properly.  
       
 
54 
 
A.4 Crude flash drum No. 2 CD2103 
 
 
   Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 1)                                                Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 9,7  Operating Pressure(barg) 6,5 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 66 
Material Carbon Steel 
SA-285-GR C 
 CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (ppm)  7 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 16,5/15,5  Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
Insulation  Yes  pH 8,3 
Sealing surface Nozzles RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF)  
 
  . 
Process Description:  
Feed from crude flash drum No. 1 (CD2102) enters vessel in top head section. The pressure is 
decreased to flash out lighter hydrocarbon components from the oil stream. The main function 
of the vessel is to separate water and gas from the oil stream.   
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, planned 
modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel…) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with Belzona from 3 to 9 o`clock (50% of internal surface coated) due to 
previous experience with corrosion attacks in the vessel. Five anodes are mounted in the 
bottom part of the vessel (Type ZT780, new in 2009).  
 
 
Inspection History Date of collection 2015-03-31 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Baseline thickness 
head/shell = 19/15,5 mm 
 
Last inspection in 2014:  
Reported overall good condition, and no corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface. 
However, localized corrosion was reported internally in nozzle N8C (5,0mm deep, nominal 
thickness is 13,0mm), internally surface corrosion in nozzle N6C, and corrosion in the sealing 
surface of the nozzle K6B (30% of primary sealing surface on RF flange). Small areas of the 
Belzona coating was damaged, these areas were repaired during the shutdown. The anode 
consumption was 5% (Last changed 2009).   
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2007, 2009 and 2011 reported localized corrosion in the 
bottom part of the vessel, with depths up to 5,0mm (last reported in 2007 after sandblasting). 
These are known damages, and no further development of the corrosion attacks have been 
observed since 2007. Generally Belzona and flange sealing surfaces have been repaired 
during shutdowns, which imply that there is a need to continuously maintain the coating and 
inspect sealing surfaces in future shutdowns.    
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA)   
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,25 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated. The combination of 0,5mol% CO2 and a pressure 
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lower than 19barg causes the CO2 fugacity to be lower than the area of validity in the model.    
The expected corrosion rate for pH 8,3 and at a pressure lower than 19 barg will most likely 
be lower than 0,25 mm/year.  
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel.     
 
Erosion: May occur in the bottom part of the vessel shell where the water jet system is used in 
combination with sand particles. The rate depends highly on the amount of sand, particle size, 
nozzle orientation and water pressure when operating the water jet system. It is possible to get 
high rates, since this may introduce the same effects as you would get from sandblasting a 
metallic material. The probability of erosion is lower than the inlet separator since most of the 
solids/particles are separated in the first separator.    
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the Belzona coating is 
intact or when the anodes protect the carbon steel with an electro potential lower than -900 
mV. 
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the Belzona coating is intact and if 
the sacrificial anodes are working properly.  
 
A.5 Crude flash drum No. 2 CD2104 
 
 
   Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 1)                                           Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 3,4  Operating Pressure(barg) 0,95 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 66,5 
Material Carbon Steel 
SA-285-GR C 
 CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (ppm)  12 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 10,5  Phase (Liquid, Gas, Water) Three Phase 
Insulation  No  pH 9,1 
Sealing surface Nozzles RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF)  
 
  . 
Process Description:  
Feed from crude flash drum No. 2 (CD2103) enters vessel in top head section. The pressure is 
decreased to flash out lighter hydrocarbon components from the oil stream. The main function 
of the vessel is to separate gas from the oil stream. The vessel is directly connected with the 
underlying Coalescer (CD2121), which entails that there aren`t any water level in the flash 
drum no. 3.  
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, planned 
modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel…) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with ceramic painting (Type CK54) from 5 to 7 o`clock (17% of internal 
surface coated) due to previous experience with corrosion attacks in the bottom part of 
vessels.  
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Inspection History Date of collection 2015-04-08 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2000, 2006 and 2009. Baseline thickness head/shell = 
13/12 mm. 
 
Last inspection in 2009:  
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
manhole and nozzle K3A (% degradation of the sealing surface not reported, but the areas 
needed to be repaired during the shutdown). Small areas of the coating were damaged, these 
wasn`t repaired and are known damages which shows no further developments since last IVI 
in 2006.  
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2000 and 2006 have reported overall good condition. 
Generally flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during shutdowns, which imply that 
there is a need to continuously inspect sealing surfaces in future shutdowns.    
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA)   
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,25 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated. The combination of 0,5mol% CO2 and a pressure 
lower than 19barg causes the CO2 fugacity to be lower than the area of validity in the model.    
The expected corrosion rate for pH 9,1and at a pressure lower than 19 barg will most likely be 
lower than 0,25 mm/year.  
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel.     
 
Erosion: The damage mechanism is neglected since there aren`t a water jet system in 
combination with solids/sand. Further the amount of solids are lighter, more or less clay. 
There could however be some small amount of sand/solids that follows the oil stream when 
the water jet system is used in flash drum No. 2(CD2103). The main reason is that sand 
particles could be stirred up during operation of the water jet system. The particles/solids are 
than mixed with the oil stream, and further on carried over in the oil outlet.   
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the coating is intact.  
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the coating is intact.                  
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A.6 Coalescer CD2121 
 
 
   Mechanical Data: (Design ASME VIII Div. 1)                                          Process Data: (In operation) 
Design Pressure (barg) 4,1  Operating Pressure(barg) 0,95 
Design Temperature (°C) 121  Operating Temperature (°C) 66,5 
Material Carbon Steel 
SA-516-GR 70 
 CO2 (mol%) measured 2013 0,5 
Corrosion Allowance (mm) 3,0  H2S (ppm)  12 
Thickness head/shell (mm) 14,5  Phase (Oil & Water) Two Phase 
Insulation  No  pH 9,1 
Sealing surface Nozzles RF*  *Note: Raised faced (RF)  
 
  . 
Process Description:  
Feed from crude flash drum No. 3 (CD2104) enters vessel in top head section. The main 
function of the vessel is to separate water from the oil stream. The vessel is directly connected 
with the overlying Crude flash drum N0. 3 (CD2104), which entails that there aren`t any gas 
level in the flash Coalescer.  
 
Comments: (Other relevant information, for example: dead legs, piece of equipment out of service, critical operations, 
planned modifications, ”special operating conditions” for example change of media in vessel…) 
There is no known overview of nozzles that are dead legs, and these must be identified as 
experiences from other fields shows higher probability of CO2 corrosion attacks due to 
accumulation of water and stagnant conditions. A case example in Appendix G is available to 
support the above statement. 
 
The vessel is coated with Belzona from 3 to 9 o`clock (50% of internal surface coated) due to 
previous experience with corrosion attacks in the vessel. Six anodes are mounted in the 
bottom part of the vessel (Type ZT780, new in 2014). 
 
 
Inspection History Date of collection 2015-04-17 
The vessel has been opened for IVI in 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Baseline thickness 
head/shell = 17,5/15 mm. 
 
Last inspection in 2014:  
Reported overall good condition. No corrosion attacks were found on the wall surface or 
internally in any of the nozzles. However, corrosion was reported in the sealing surface of the 
vales to nozzle K6C, N6D and K1A (From 20 to 50% of primary sealing surface on RF 
flanges). Small areas of the Belzona coating was damaged, these areas were repaired during 
the shutdown. The anode consumption was 30-50% (Last changed 2006). New anodes 
mounted during the shutdown.  
 
Historical inspections: 
Previous inspections performed in 2006, 2009 and 2011 reported localized corrosion 
internally in several nozzles. Several repaired with Belzona, and some with welding. 
Generally Belzona and flange sealing surfaces have been repaired during shutdowns, which 
imply that there is a need to continuously maintain the coating and inspect sealing surfaces in 
future shutdowns.    
 
Corrosion Risk Assessment (CRA)   
Damaged Mechanisms 
H2S, CO2, MIC, Erosion. 
 
CO2:  Calculations for CO2 corrosion rate have been performed according to the Norsok M-
506 model, and the results show an expected corrosion rate of approximately 0,25 mm/year. 
The allowed pH range of the model is pH 3,5 to 6,5, and an accurate corrosion rate for pH 
higher than 6,5 could not be calculated. The combination of 0,5mol% CO2 and a pressure 
58 
 
lower than 19barg causes the CO2 fugacity to be lower than the area of validity in the model.    
The expected corrosion rate for pH 9,1and at a pressure lower than 19 barg will most likely be 
lower than 0,25 mm/year.  
 
H2S: The influence of H2S could affect the corrosion rate depending on the H2S/CO2 ratio, but 
there are no available recognized standards that could be used to estimate the effects. This 
phenomenon needs more research. Sour service due to H2S is not applicable since the partial 
pressure is lower than 0,3 kPa, however the sulfur may lead to general corrosion. This could 
be seen as a layer of FeS internal in the vessel.     
 
Erosion: The damage mechanism is neglected since the amount of solids are lighter, more or 
less clay. There could however be some small amount of sand/solids that follows the oil 
stream when the water jet system is used in flash drum No. 2(CD2103). The main reason is 
that sand particles could be stirred up during operation of the water jet system. The 
particles/solids are than mixed with the oil stream, and further on carried over in the oil outlet.   
 
MIC: Analysis performed during the shutdown in 2012 ranked possible MIC corrosion to be 
at the risk level medium/high. However corrosion would not occur if the Belzona coating is 
intact or when the anodes protect the carbon steel with an electro potential lower than -900 
mV. 
 
Corrosion of the bottom part of the vessel will not occur if the Belzona coating is intact and if 
the sacrificial anodes are working properly.        
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Appendix B – Pictures taken during offshore survey of pressure 
vessels 
 
 
Test Separator CD2018 
  
Picture 1. Separator insulated, picture taken 
from manhole side.  
Picture 2. Separator insulated, picture taken 
from the bottom part. Lack of access due to 
supporting structure.  
Train 1 - Inlet Separator CD2101 
  
Picture 3. Separator insulated, picture taken 
from manhole side. 
Picture 4. Separator insulated, picture 
taken from the bottom part. Lack of access 
due to supporting structure. 
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Train 1 - Flash Drum No. 1 CD2102 
 
 
Picture 5. Separator insulated, picture taken 
from manhole side. 
Picture 6. Separator insulated, picture 
taken from the bottom part. Easy access 
from floor. 
Train 1 - Flash Drum No. 2 CD2103 
  
Picture 7. Separator insulated, picture taken 
from manhole side. 
Picture 8. Separator insulated, picture 
taken from the bottom part. Easy access 
from deck. 
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Train 1 - Flash Drum No. 3 CD2104 
 
 
 
 
Picture 9. Separator not insulated, picture taken 
from manhole side. 
Picture 10. Separator not insulated, 
picture taken from the bottom part. Easy 
access from lower vessel. 
Train 1 – Coalescer CD2121 
  
Picture 11. Vessel not insulated, picture taken 
from south side.  
Picture 12. Vessel not insulated, picture 
taken from the bottom part. Easy access 
from deck. 
 
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) of pressure vessels UiS 
 
62 
 
Appendix C – Production profile and data 
 
The water level is at a peak now, and the prediction is that is should decrease in the feature. The gas would increase until 2017/18, but due to limitations 
of the topside compressors it would be more or less constant gas production. The oil level is predicted to decrease each year, and drop to about no oil 
production at 2021.    
 
Chart C-1: Production profile since 1995 to 2014. Oil and gas production has decreased, and the water rate is dominating the total production (PI 
Processbook, 2015; Specialist 3, 2015).  
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Chart C-2: Production layout. A snap shot of the oil and gas production system, which includes both separation trains (PI Processbook, 2015, Specialist 
3, 2015).    
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Chart C-3: Trending of the temperature and pressure in the test separator (CD2018) in a period of 97 days. The light blue line indicates the temperature 
in degrees of Celsius, and the green line the pressure in barg (PI Processbook, 2015).    
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Chart C-4: Trending of the temperature and pressure in the inlet separator (CD2101) in a period of 97 days. The light blue line indicates the temperature 
in degrees of Celsius, and the green line the pressure in barg (PI Processbook, 2015).    
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Chart C-5: Trending of the temperature and pressure in the crude flash drum No.1 (CD2102) in a period of 97 days. The light blue line indicates the 
temperature in degrees of Celsius, and the green line the pressure in barg (PI Processbook, 2015).     
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Chart C-6: Trending of the temperature and pressure in the crude flash drum No.2 (CD2103) in a period of 97 days. The light blue line indicates the 
temperature in degrees of Celsius, and the green line the pressure in barg. The scaling is logarithmic in the y-axis to better view pressure changes (PI 
Processbook, 2015).        
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Chart C-6: Trending of the temperature and pressure in the crude flash drum No.3 (CD2104) and the Coalescer (CD2121) in a period of 97 days. The 
light blue line indicates the temperature in degrees of Celsius, and the green line the pressure in barg. The scaling is logarithmic in the y-axis to better 
view pressure changes (PI Processbook, 2015).        
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Appendix D – NII analyze results of selected vessels 
D.1 NII Preliminary screening 
 
NII preliminary screening results are provided in Table D-1 below, which also includes information about the criticality of each vessel. 
NII 
Screening  
Client: Statoil ASA 
Author: Andreas 
Eriksson 
NII Preliminary screening (Figure 2-2) 
Functional 
Location  
Description 
Overall 
Criticality 
(HSE, 
production, costs 
and containment) 
A: Is the vessel 
intrinsically 
suitable for 
NII? 
 
 
If NO = No 
NII 
B: Has vessel 
previous 
been 
inspected? 
 
 
If NO Go to 
C,  
If YES Go to 
E 
C: Was 
vessel 
designed 
specifically 
for NII? 
 
If NO Go to 
D,  
If YES Go to 
F 
D: Is vessel the 
same as others 
for which 
service history 
exists? 
 
If NO = NO NII, 
If YES Go to F 
E: Is 
operating 
history still 
relevant?  
 
 
If  NO Go to 
C If YES Go 
to F 
F: Is entry 
scheduled for 
other 
reason? 
 
If NO = 
Apply High 
level 
decision,  
If YES= 
Perform IVI) 
CD2018 Test separator Very high NO NA NA NA NA NA 
CD2101 Inlet separator Very high NO NA NA NA NA NA 
CD2102 Crude flash drum No.1 Very high YES YES NA NA YES NO 
CD2103 Crude flash drum No.2 High YES YES NA NA YES NO 
CD2104 Crude flash drum No 3 High Yes Yes NA NA Yes NO 
CD2121 Coalescer  High Yes Yes NA NA Yes NO 
Table D-1: NII preliminary screening of all vessels in production train one.  
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D.2 NII High level screening 
 
NII high level decision is provided in Table D-2 below, also including justification and comments for the selection.     
 
NII Screening  Client: Statoil ASA 
Author: 
Andreas 
Eriksson 
NII High Level screening (Figure 2-3) 
Functional 
Location  
Description 
Overall 
Criticality 
(HSE, 
production, 
costs and 
containment) 
Confidence in 
ability to 
predict type 
and location of 
degradation 
 Previous 
inspection 
effectiveness 
Severity 
and rate of 
degradation 
NII 
Possible Comments 
CD2018 Test separator Very high NA NA NA NA The vessel is screened due to: 
1) Corrosion risk assessment is not 
adequate/valid for future operational 
conditions. 
2) The supporting structure limits 
access to the bottom part which is of 
interest, and there are no known NDT 
methods for inspection of the RTJ 
sealing surfaces.   
CD2101 Inlet separator Very high NA NA NA NA The vessel is screened due to: 
1) There are no known NDT methods 
for inspection of the RTJ sealing 
surfaces.   
CD2102 Crude flash drum No.1 Very high Medium Medium High NO, 
changed to 
Yes based 
on 
justification 
comment. 
Same as CD2104 
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CD2103 Crude flash drum No.2 High Medium Medium High NO, 
changed to 
Yes based 
on 
justification 
comment. 
Same as CD2104, and the same 
justification applies for the high 
corrosion rates at nozzle N8C. 
CD2104 Crude flash drum No 3 High Medium Medium High NO, 
changed to 
Yes based 
on 
justification 
comment. 
NII not possible mainly based on the 
answer given in the last question. 
However, if the previous inspections 
effectiveness had been high, than NII 
would be possible. A high previously 
inspection effectiveness wouldn't 
change the experience related to 
degradation of flanges and NDT of 
sealing surfaces would actually 
reduce the risk of a potential failure 
prior to scheduled shutdowns. NII is 
possible and risk reducing based on 
the justification above. 
CD2121 Coalescer  High Medium Medium High NO, 
changed to 
Yes based 
on 
justification 
comment. 
Same as CD2104 
Table D-2: NII high level screening of all vessels in production train one.  
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D.3 Definition of vessel zones and selection of degradation type 
 
Definition of vessel zones and selection of degradation types within each inspection zone is listed in Table D-3 bellow.  
Functional location A) Definition of Vessel Zones B) Definition of Degradation Type 
Tag No. Description Location Zone Feature Degradation Mechanism Defect Type 
CD2104 Crude flash drum No 3 
Above fluid level 
A Cylindrical Shell A CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
B Cylindrical Shell B CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
C Nozzles CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
D Raised Faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
Below fluid level 
E Cylindrical Shell D 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
F Nozzles 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
G Raised Faiced surface 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
CD2102 Crude flash drum No.1 
Gas zone 
A Cylindrical shell A CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
B Nozzles B CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
Oil and water zone 
C Cylindrical shell B 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
D Nozzles C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
All zones E Raised faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
CD2103 Crude flash drum No.2 
Gas zone 
A Cylindrical shell A CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
B Nozzles B CO2/H2S General Corrosion 
Oil and water zone C Cylindrical shell C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
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D Nozzles C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
All zones E Raised faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
CD2121 Coalescer  
Oil and water zone 
A Top Cylindrical shell A 
MIC  
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
    
B Nozzles B 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
    
Water zone 
C Cylindrical shell C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
    
D Nozzles D 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized Corrosion 
General Corrosion 
    All zones E Raised faced surface Corrosion Localized Corrosion 
Table D-3: Definition of vessel zones and selection of degradation type for all vessels in production train one.  
 
D.4 Selection of inspection strategy types 
 
Selection of inspection strategy type for each vessel and their zones is listed in Table D-4 bellow.  
 
Functional 
location A) Definition of Vessel Zones C) Inspection Strategy Type 
Tag No. Location Zone Feature 
Degradation 
Likelihood 
Degradation 
Extent 
Degradation 
Rate  
Inspection 
Type Comment 
CD2104 
Above fluid 
level 
A 
Cylindrical Shell 
A Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
B 
Cylindrical Shell 
B Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
C Nozzles Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) of pressure vessels UiS 
 
74 
 
corrosion rate 
D 
Raised Faced 
surface High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
Below fluid 
level 
E 
Cylindrical Shell 
D 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
F Nozzles 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
G 
Raised faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
CD2102 
Gas zone 
A 
Cylindrical shell 
A 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
B Nozzles B 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
Oil and water 
zone 
C 
Cylindrical shell 
B 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
D Nozzles C 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
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CD2103 
Gas zone 
A 
Cylindrical shell 
A 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
B Nozzles B 
Medium 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
Oil and water 
zone 
C 
Cylindrical shell 
C 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
D Nozzles C 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion High C 
Based on inspection 
history, Nozzle N8C 
All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
CD2121 
  
  
  
  
Oil and water 
zone 
A 
Cylindrical shell 
A 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
B Nozzles B 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
Water zone 
C 
Cylindrical shell 
C 
Medium 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Medium A 
Based on CRA 
probability and 
corrosion rate 
D Nozzles D 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
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All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
High 
Localized 
Corrosion 
(Clearly 
identifiable) High C 
Based on inspection 
history 
Table D-4: Selection of inspection type at the inspection zones for all vessels in production train one.  
 
D.5 Selection of minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage 
 
Selection of minimum inspection effectiveness and coverage for each vessel and their inspection zones is listed in Table D-5 bellow.  
Functional 
location 
A) Definition of Vessel 
Zones 
D) Minimum Inspection Effectiveness and Coverage 
Tag No. 
Descript-
ion Location Zone Feature 
Inspec-
tion 
grade 
Current tolerance 
of degradation 
Consequence of 
failure 
Minimum 
inspection 
effectiveness  
Confidence 
(Figure 2-3) Coverage 
CD2104 
Crude 
flash 
drum 
No.3 
Above 
fluid level 
A 
Cylindrical 
Shell A Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
B 
Cylindrical 
Shell B Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
C Nozzles Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
D 
Raised 
Faced 
surface Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
Below 
fluid level 
E 
Cylindrical 
Shell D Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
F Nozzles 
Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
G 
Raised 
Faced 
surface Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
CD2102 
Crude 
flash 
Gas zone A 
Cylindrical 
shell A Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
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drum 
No.1 
B Nozzles B Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
Oil and 
water zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell B Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
D Nozzles C 
Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
All zones E 
Raised 
faced 
surface Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
CD2103 
Crude 
flash 
drum 
No.2 
Gas zone 
A 
Cylindrical 
shell A Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
B Nozzles B Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
Oil and 
water zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell C Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
D Nozzles C 
Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
All zones E 
Raised 
faced 
surface Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
CD2121 Coalescer  
Oil and 
water zone 
A 
Cylindrical 
shell A Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Targeted plus 
    
B Nozzles B 
Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
    Water 
zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell C Grade 3 Medium High Medium Medium Global 
    
D Nozzles D 
Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
    
All zones E 
Raised 
faced 
surface Grade 0 Low High High Medium Global 
Table D-5: Selection of inspection type at inspection zones for all vessels in production train one 
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D.6 Selection inspection methods  
 
Selection of inspection methods to meet the minimum required inspection effectiveness is listed in Table D-6 bellow.  
Functional 
location 
A) Definition of Vessel 
Zones 
B) Definition of 
Degradation Type 
Determine efficiency of candidate inspection 
methods 
Tag No. 
Descript-
ion Location Zone Feature 
Degradation 
Mechanism Defect Type 
Surf-
ace 
Insul-
ated Thickness(mm) 
Selected technique 
(POD/sizing) 
CD2104 
Crude flash 
drum No.3 
Above 
fluid level 
A 
Cylindrical 
Shell A CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO 
head/shell = 13/12 
mm  
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
B 
Cylindrical 
Shell B CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO 
head/shell = 13/12 
mm  
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
C Nozzles CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
D 
Raised Faced 
surface Corrosion 
Localized 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
Flange scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
Below fluid 
level 
E 
Cylindrical 
Shell D 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO 
head/shell = 13/12 
mm  
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
F Nozzles 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
G 
Raised Faced 
surface 
MIC 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
Flange scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
CD2102 
Crude flash 
drum No.1 
Gas zone A 
Cylindrical 
shell A CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES 
head/shell = 
48,5/37 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
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B Nozzles B 
CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
Oil and 
water zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell B 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES 
head/shell = 
48,5/37 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
D Nozzles C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
Corrosion 
Localized 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
Flange scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
CD2103 
Crude flash 
drum No.2 
Gas zone 
A 
Cylindrical 
shell A CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES 
head/shell = 
19/15,5 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
B Nozzles B 
CO2/H2S 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
Oil and 
water zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES 
head/shell = 
19/15,5 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
D Nozzles C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
Corrosion 
Localized 
Corrosion Paint YES Various 
Flange scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
CD2121 Coalescer  
Oil and 
water zone 
A 
Cylindrical 
shell A 
MIC  
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO 
head/shell = 
17,5/15 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
    
B Nozzles B 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General Paint NO Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
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Corrosion 
    
Water zone 
C 
Cylindrical 
shell C 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO 
head/shell = 
17,5/15 mm 
Phased Array – XY 
scanner(H/H) 
    
D Nozzles D 
MIC & Erosion 
CO2/H2S  
Localized 
Corrosion 
General 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
TOFD/Phased 
Array(H/H) 
    
All zones E 
Raised faced 
surface 
Corrosion 
Localized 
Corrosion Paint NO Various 
Flange scanner – 
Phased Array 
(H/H) 
Table D-6: Selection of inspection methods for each inspection zone that meets the minimum required inspection effectiveness all vessels in production 
train one. 
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Appendix E – General arrangement drawings with marked out inspection zones  
 
General arrangement drawings for all vessels are listed below. Each inspection zone is marked out with a suffix (A-Z), which is used as a reference of 
each zone in the tables in Appendix D.  
 
E.1 Crude flash drum No. 3(CD2104) 
 
 
 
Drawing E-1: General arrangement drawing of crude flash drum No. 3 (CD2104), each inspection zone and location is marked with a suffix (From A-Z). 
Brown are marks out the area with liquid (oil and water), and the yellow area the gas level (STIDtips, 2015). 
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E.2 Crude flash drum No. 1(CD2102)  
 
 
 
 
Drawing E-2: General arrangement drawing of crude flash drum No. 1 (CD2102), each inspection zone and location is marked with a suffix (From A-Z). 
Brown are marks out the area with liquid (oil and water), and the yellow area the gas level (STIDtips, 2015). 
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E.3 Crude flash drum No. 2 (CD2103) 
 
 
 
 
Drawing E-3: General arrangement drawing of crude flash drum No. 2 (CD2103), each inspection zone and location is marked with a suffix (From A-Z). 
Brown are marks out the area with liquid (oil and water), and the yellow area the gas level (STIDtips, 2015). 
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E.4 Coalescer (CD2121) 
 
 
 
Drawing E-4: General arrangement drawing of Coalescer (CD2121), each inspection zone and location is marked with a suffix (From A-Z). Brown are 
marks out the area with liquid (oil and water), and the blue area the water level (STIDtips, 2015). 
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Appendix F – NDT Decision flow charts  
 
Flow chart F-1: UT thickness gauge flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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 Flow chart F-2: Manual 0° UT Mapping flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-3: UT Corrosion Mapping flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-4: UT Angled Pulse Echo flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-5: Time of Flight Diffraction flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-6: Medium Range UT (LORUS) flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-7: Medium Range UT (CHIME) flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-8: Long Range UT (LRUT – Guided Wave) flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-9: Magnetic Flux Exclusion flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-10: Pulsed Eddy Current flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-11: Saturation Low Frequency Eddy Current (SLOFEC) flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Flow chart F-12: Passive Thermography flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) of pressure vessels UiS 
 
97 
 
 
Flow chart F-13: Radiography flow chart (DNV, 2011) 
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Appendix G – Corrosion case examples 
 
1. Scrubber - Nozzle dead leg. CO2 due to condensation and accumulation of water.  
 
 
 
Drawing G-1: Internal corrosion in the ¾”-
pipe marked out in the read ring.  
 
Picture G-1: Areas of general corrosion and 
details of a small hole in the pipe wall. 
Corrosion rate 0,5mm/year.   
2. Separator – Corrosion of RTJ sealing surface.  
  
Drawing G-2: Corroded RTJ-sealing surface 
at nozzle N10.   
 
Picture G-2: RTJ - primary sealing surface 
100% corroded and 50% of RTJ - secondary 
sealing surface after 3 years in service.  
3. Separator – Corrosion of RF sealing surface. 
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Drawing G-3: Corroded RF-sealing surface at 
nozzle N6C.   
 
Picture G-3: Primary RF - sealing surface 
35% corroded after 6 years in service. 
Repaired with Belzona coating. 
 
 
 
 
 
